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SILVER V. REAGAN U,., C.2d 924; 84 Cal.Rptr. 325, 434 P.2d 821] [67 C.2d 924 
[Sac. No. 7814. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1967.] 
PHILL SILVER et at, Petitioners, v. RONALD REAGAN, 
as Governor, etc., et aI., Respondents. 
[Sac. No. 7815. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1967.] 
ABE VICKTER et al., Petitioners, v. RONALD REAGAN, 
as Governor, etc., et at, Respondents; THE SENATE 
AND THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA, Interveners. 
[1] Constitutional Law-Operation and E1feet of ConstitutioD-
Reapportionment of Congressional Districts-1967 Redistrict-
mg.-Stats. 1967, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 2, providing for the redis-
tricting of the state's congressional districts, meets the govern-
ing requirements of the U. S. Supreme Court decisions. as 
discussed in Silver v. Reagan (1967) ante, p. 452 [62Cal.Rptr. 
424,432 P.2d 26], and is constitutional. 
THE COURT.-In these congressional reapportionment 
proceedings the Governor, the Secretary of State, the Attor-
ney General, and the Senate and the Assembly of the State of 
California have submitted to the court chapter 2 of the Stat-
utes of 1967, Second Extraordinary Session providing for the 
redistricting of the state's congressional districts. They 
request that the court declare chapter 2 constitutional and 
instruct the Secretary of State to inform all election officials 
to follow chapter 2 in preparing for and carrying out the 1968 
primary and general elections. We have reviewed chapter 2 in 
the light of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
governing us herein (Silver v. Reagan (1967) ante, p. 452 
[62 Ca1.Rptr. 424, 432 P.2d 26]), and we have considered the 
objections submitted by several citizens. We conclude that 
chapter 2 is constitutional and that the relief requested 
should be granted. 
The Secretary of State is instructed to inform all election 
officials to follow chapter 2 in preparing for and carrying out 
the 1968 primary and general elections. The alternative writs 
of mandate heretofore issued are discharged and the proceed-
ings are dismissed. 
See Am.Jur.2d, Elections, §§ 12-15, 30, 32. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 16.5. 
) 
July 1962] PEOPLE EX REL. DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS v. FORSTER 257 
(58 C.2d 257: 23 Cal.Rptr. 582. 373 P.2d 630] 
[L. A. No. 26507. In Bank. JUly 31,1962.] 
THE PEOPLE ex reI. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIO 
WOllKS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HUGO A. FOR-
STER et a1., Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Evidenc~Admissions-Offers to Oompromise.-Offers of com-
promise are not admi!'siblc in evidence as such. The reason 
for the rule is that a person is entitled to endeavor to "buy 
his peace" without fear that his offers of compromise for such 
purpose will be used against him if not accepted. 
[2] Compromis~Policy of Law.-The law favors compromises. 
[8] Evidenc~Admissions-Offers to Compromise.-The declara-
tion, in an offer of compromise, of facts involved in a con-
troversy which are not mere eoncessions made for the purpose 
of such offer, but are statements of independent facts, are 
admissible against the party making them. 
[4] Id.-Admissions-Offers to Compromise.-If a concession in 
an offer of compromise is hypothetical or conditional, it can 
never be interpreted as an assertion representing the party's 
actual belief and therefore cannot be an admission; conversely, 
an unconditional assertion is l'eceivable without any regard to 
the circumstances which accompany it. 
(5] Id.-Admissions-Offers to Compromise.-If an express ad-
mission is in terms made, it is receivable, even though it forms 
part of an offer to compromise. The occasion of the utterance 
is not decisive; what is important is the form of the statement, 
whether it is explicit and absolute. . 
[6] Id.-Admissions-Offers to Compromise.-The intention of a 
party is the crucial point in determining whether his state-
ment amounts to an ordinary admission or constitutes an offer 
of compromise. If the proposal is tentative and any statements 
made in connection with it hypothetical, or if the offer was 
made to ''buy peace" and in contemplation of mutual conces-
sions, it is as to such point a mere offer of compromise; but 
if the intention is apparent to admit liability and to seek to 
buy or secure relief against a liability recognized as such, or 
t 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 406; Am.Jur., Evidence, (1st ed . 
• 565). 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 2; Am.Jur., 
Compromise and Settlement (1st ed. § 4). 
lIeX. Dig. References: [1, 3-6] Evidence, § 190; [2] Comprom-
lie, § 2; [7,8] Eminent Domain, § 155; [9] Eminent Domain, § 175; 
[10] Eminent Domain, § 64 . 
• C.Id-t 
848 IN RE RIDDLE [57 C.2!1 
the same power to admit the report and rebuttal testimony 
as the panel would have had if it had conducted the hearing. 
The referee exercised this power, and the report and rebuttal 
testimony became a proper part of the record, as the panel 
conceded in stating that it could consider the report if it 
wished to do so. 
[ 5 ] The panel was obliged" to achieve a substantial un-
derstanding of the record," including this evidence. (A.llied 
Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial A.cc. Com., supra, p. 
120.) It could not achieve a substantial understanding of 
the record when it refused to consider a proper part thereof. 
The award is annulled and the case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
The petition of respondent Industrial Accident Commission 
for a rehearing was denied JUly 11, 1962. 
) 
74 M.A.GlT V. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS [57 C.2d 
jury returned a special verdict finding that defendant was 
guilty of negligence and that plaintiff-appellant Grossman was 
guilty of contributory negligence; nor is there a suggestion 
that such plaintiff.appellant requested, and the trial court 
refused to instruct the jury to return, a special verdict pur-
suant to Code of Civil Procedure, sections 624 and 625. 
In the absence of such a special finding, or of a request 
therefor refused by the trial court, the reversal ~ppears to be 
based on unwarranted speculation and is, therefore, obnoxious 
to the Constitution, article VI, section 4%. This conclusion is 
emphasized by the fact that the evidence strongly supports 
the implied finding that defendant was not guilty of any 
negligence proximately causing injury to the plaintiffs. 
For the reasons stated the judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
